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This paper investigates the important role of narrative in social science case-based research. The focus is
on the use of narrative in creating a productive ordering of the materials within such cases, and on how
such ordering functions in relation to ‘narrative explanation’. It argues that narrative ordering based on
juxtaposition - using an analogy to certain genres of visual representation - is associated with creating
and resolving puzzles in the research ﬁeld. Analysis of several examples shows how the use of conceptual
or theoretical resources within the narrative ordering of ingredients enables the narrative explanation of
the case to be resituated at other sites, demonstrating how such explanations can attain scope without
implying full generality.
 2017 The Author. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND
license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).1. Introduction: the conjunctions of narrative and
explanation
Historians take it for granted that their narratives explain the
events and phenomena in their ﬁelds, and hold an unstated intui-
tion that such narratives focus on events in time. Scholars of
narrative too, provide deﬁnitions of narrative that are determinedly
sparse, even reductive, yet all depend fundamentally on a notion of
passing time.1 And while narrative scholars are not interested
(apparently) in explanation, some hints of explanation are present
by default, for the one thing they seem to agree on is that a
‘chronicle’ is not a ‘narrative’. Chronicles order events through time,
but imply nothing more about the relations between them. In
contrast, narratives, not only order through time, but imply, deli-
cately or directly, relationships between such events. For example,
the chronicle of the female monarchs of England/Britain: Mary I,
Elizabeth I, Mary II, Anne, Victoria, Elizabeth II, can be contrasted
with the implicit assumption of connection that marks a narrative:
The Queen died, the King came to the throne, and the Princess ran
away. Such relations might rely on dependency notions, might
implicate inﬂuences or causes, or might involve contingencies:
those three elements which often appear in historians’ use of
narrative.‘Narrative in Science’.
).
e on narrative that stretches
hy: recent surveys from the
n (2009).
Ltd. This is an open access article u
. S., & Hirschman, A. O., Narr
psa.2017.03.006For historians, narratives explain how things happen and why
things happen, not apparently so far from the tasks set out for
science, and indeed, in some sites of science, scientists use the
narrative form of explanation in their scientiﬁc work. This imme-
diately raises the question: do narratives in science work in the
same kind of ways as narratives in history, or as narratives gener-
ally? There are certainly those who doubt that narratives can be
explanatory in science. In the mid-20th century, philosophers of
science (Hempel, 1965) took it for granted that history was not a
science (in their terms): there were no laws in history, and histor-
ical narratives could only be, and were only, about particulars - so
could not offer scientiﬁc (law-based) explanations. More recently,
philosophers of science have taken a different line: explanations
are given as answers to ‘why-questions’ (van Fraassen, 1980),
opening the door to mechanistic and causal kinds of explanations
in the sciences (see Crasnow, in press, and Beatty, in press), but not
from thence to history. Just as chronicles remain an outcast for
narrative scholars, so history, and its explanatory narrative mode of
argument, remains an outcast in the broader kinship of the
sciences.
Yet scientists, for some kinds of phenomena, and with some
ways of working, regularly use narratives and the task in this paper
is to explore, and to characterise, theways inwhich narratives work
in such scientiﬁc locations as a form of explanation. The argument
begins here with the claim that what narratives do above all else is
create a productive order amongst materials with the purpose to
answer why and how questions. Novelists pick out particular
events, particular relations, and order them to create a gripping
story; their question-answering or problem-solving nature is of
course most evident in detective stories. Similarly, historians picknder the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
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der them to create a narrative account in answer to historical
questions or problems. And while both narrative scholars and
historians have seen time as the dominant line upon which these
elements are woven together, the important umbrella notion here
is not time but ordering, for which time offers a very convenient
metric, a metric which may disguise other ordering principles. It is
the ability and facility to order materials and weave them together
to form explanations - regardless of whether the warp is a time
thread, or a space thread, or a theoretical or conceptual thread -
that characterises narrative.
Consider again the ‘Queen, King, Princess’ narrative example
given above. The sequence of events is typically read as happening
through time, though it could have happened more or less simul-
taneously. Less ambiguous is our tendency to read into the order
that these events are related to each other in which the Queen’s
death seems to be the critical factor for the actions of the King and
the Princess. Re-ordering events creates a different story: the King
came to the throne, the Princess ran away and the Queen died
makes the King the focal prompt for the events. The ordering is
critical to the narrative’s interpretation, and whether it is genuinely
a time ordering or not is less critical. Scientiﬁc examples of this
ordering issue abound: It might be that the important points in
explaining the behaviour of someone in a psychiatric case study is
the behaviour of their parents; time itself is not the dominant
ordering line but a hook for narrating those other reasons. Simi-
larly, the extinction of dinosaurs found in the fossil record
happened in time, but the dominant evolutionary factors that
explain that extinction are not ﬁtted to strict units of time: that
extinction could have taken a longer or shorter time. Some narra-
tives do dance to units of time: circadian rhythms, or develop-
mental processes from egg to caterpillar to chrysalis to moth (see
Terrall, in press). But time is more often a marker of events than a
driver of events, and oftentimes it is not even so important as a
marker, but rather the material in which we see the dependency of
relations or the unfolding of events. That being so, the basis of
narrative in the sciences is not time per se, but the possibility of
being able to order events—to pick out a set of relevant elements
and put them into order, that is, into relation with each other.
The implications that narrative ordering and practices have for
explanation requires further argument. This account is prompted
by considering the reasons for the Cinderella status both of history
in the sciences and of chronicles amongst the narratives, and by
wondering if those exclusions provide productive materials for
understanding the role of narratives in the sciences.
* Narrative is not chronicle, because its principle of ordering in-
volves not just time sequencing, but connecting, and this
connectedness is required for claims about narrative’s explanatory
function in science. It may depend for this dominant ordering de-
vice on time or some other thread, but it must also involve some
elements of relationship: causes, processes of change, puzzle
solving, etc. And the resulting narrativemay represent evolutionary
paths, the unfolding of development processes, identity formation,
the integration and synthesizing of elements, or creation of a
mosaic/jigsaw - but not just a listing of order.
* Narrative science is not history, because it deals in various ways
with more than particulars.2 It develops or invokes categories,
concepts, theories and other generic kinds of materials which are
germane in giving an account of phenomena in any speciﬁc sci-
entiﬁc site and context. This combination of generic and particular2 Historians will argue this too in so far as they deal in generic categories such as
war, revolution, class, and so forth, but see Roth (in press) who disputes this.
Please cite this article in press as: Morgan, M. S., & Hirschman, A. O., Narr
Science (2017), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.shpsa.2017.03.006is evident even in the briefest scientiﬁc examples given above, and
will become better attested in the case materials discussed later.
Scientiﬁc narratives focus on the reasons how and why things
happen, whether these are ordered through time, or along some
other perspective. Thus, it is the ability of the narrative scientist (as
for the novelist or historian) notmerely to order their materials, but
to do so in answering how or why questions that lies at the heart of
narrative, and thus the possibilities of narrative explanation in
various sites of science.
Narrative forms of explanation have ontological implications,
and perhaps involve novel epistemological principles. These are not
necessarily evident a priori, nor necessarily shared across those
sites of science where narratives are used, for neither narrative nor
science should be considered standardized categories. Rather,
narratives occur as a form in which things become known, and as a
means of explanation, in various different sites of science. The
fertile territories are not only the obvious ones: natural historical
sciences (evolutionary biology, palaeontology, geology), but also
the case studies of medicine and the human sciences, along with
accounts in the complex natural and social sciences such as ecology
and sociology. More surprisingly they ﬁnd ready space in making
sense out of mathematical simulations in the natural sciences and
economics, in giving accounts of chemical reactions, and in coun-
terfactual approaches in political science.3 These are sites in which
scientists get to know things via narrative, not because the narra-
tive provides an illustrative example for theories or models or
something else, nor because it is ‘merely’ rhetoric (though rhetoric
is never ‘mere’), but because narrative is how the relationships
amongst their materials become known to them. That in turn
suggests that the narrative form of explanation reveals or evidences
ontological commitments about the nature of the scientiﬁc mate-
rials at hand - that they are evolving materials, or complex mate-
rials, or synthesized materials, and so forth.
Questions of epistemology offer a more evident terrain: how do
scientists construct their narratives, and so what kind of ordering
principles do we ﬁnd at work in scientists’ narratives? Is there a
methodology and epistemology of narrative science, or are there
perhaps several? In order to consider these questions about epis-
temology in a more speciﬁc way, I discuss the narratives of social
science case studies, rather than more obvious candidates from the
natural historical sciences. This means starting with the most
difﬁcult sites because these case studies do not have any of the
obvious features that are assumed to characterise narratives and
that are found in narrative deﬁnitions. That is, they don’t have
obvious beginnings, middles and ends; they don’t necessarily have
time as the main dimension; nor do they have obvious causes,
contingencies or changes of state. Rather, they offer documentary
reports from the ﬁeld as narratives which meld multiple small
stories and commentaries, and multiple perspectives within the
narrative, and they usually involve generic or conceptual elements
in order to tell particular narratives. Analysis of four examples of
such case studies will ﬁgure in the course of this paper (other cases
appear by way of further illustration). The ﬁrst two cases are so-
ciologists’ community studies from the 1920s and 1930s, the third
case is a late twentieth-century study from industrial economics
and the ﬁnal one is a post-WWII classic of anthropology. Different
community norms mean that these scientists differ in the ways
they deal with and analyse their materials, and in the ways that3 See Wise (2011, and in press) for examples of narratives and simulations from
physics; Morgan, 2001 and 2007 for examples from economics; Crasnow (2012 and
in press) for narratives in political science; Rosales (in press), Terrall (in press), and
Currie and Sterelny (in press) for natural historical sciences; and Hurwitz (in press)
for medicine.
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characteristic ways in which those scholars create order in their
case-study materials and provide the joined-up accounts found in
narratives, regardless of their ﬁeld.2. Conﬁguring
Let me begin this account of how scientists order their materials
by looking not to general philosophy of science or narrative studies,
but to philosophy of history. Louis Mink (1970 and 1978, p 129)
introduced the term ‘conﬁguring’ to deﬁne the characteristic way in
which historians worked with their materials - not just putting
them in order but showing how they relate together - to achieve
historical explanation:
An historical narrative does not demonstrate the necessity of
events but makes them intelligible by unfolding the story which
connects their signiﬁcance (Mink, 1970, p 545).
For Mink, the notion of explanation coming from such a ‘conﬁgu-
rational account’ stood in contrast with two other forms of expla-
nation, namely the ‘theoretical mode’ of explanation which
involved laws (scientiﬁc explanation) and the ‘categoreal mode’
which involved ﬁtting an element or object into a class or category
or under a conceptual framework (as in philosophy). Conﬁguring
refers to ameans of ‘ordering’ the elements to ﬁt together, and from
that being able to ‘grasp the whole’ together as in grasping a
‘career’, that is, making sense of the whole.4
Mink’s useful notion of conﬁguring needs to be ﬁtted out with
additional elements if it is to be appropriate for these social science
case studies. First, the ordering mechanisms for narratives need to
be teased out, contra Mink who argued that there were ‘no rules for
the construction of a narrative’ 1978, p 145). And secondly, to make
these valid scientiﬁc narratives, these ordering principles are likely
to incorporate conceptual or abstract or general elements from a
scientiﬁc ﬁeld (that is, they need to allow elements from Mink’s
‘theoretical mode’, or even the ‘categoreal mode’).5 The ways these
conceptual elements ﬁt into the ordering principles ﬁnd parallels in
the visual arts in which, of course, representations without time
predominant, and some genres of which incorporate conceptual
elements.
I beginwith two straightforward elements to set up the analogy.
First, paintings, like narratives, generate or deﬁne their own space.
Both artists and scientists choose what to depict, place boundaries
around those materials, and offer internal frames within. In social
science case-study research, the narrated community is bounded
by place, time, and question/topic/theme of the research (see
Morgan, 2012). Within these frames, the scientist brings together
all the elements that ﬁt under their chosen topic of study. Some-
times, these boundaries and their contents are quite easily deter-
mined by the materials, such as in the case study of a 24 h radio
fund-raiser in WWII (Mass Persuasion, Merton, Lowenthal, & Curtis,
1946). At other times, the material is more difﬁcult to bound, as in
the study of a slum community (Street Corner Society, Whyte, 1943),4 The notion of a ‘career’ has connotations of a time domain ordering, but Mink
was here aiming to move historical narrative away from a narrow view of the time
elements, to get at the view from above, not the view of passing of events (see
Beatty’s discussion in press).
5 Mink argued that these modes of comprehension could not be reduced to each
other, but my analysis here suggests that scientiﬁc narratives may embed reference
to theoretical terms (which suggest links to covering law modes of explanation)
and to conceptual terms (which relate to the philosophical mode of thinking), but
without being reductive to either.
Please cite this article in press as: Morgan, M. S., & Hirschman, A. O., Narr
Science (2017), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.shpsa.2017.03.006which could easily have developed materials in more directions
and opened up further themes.
Second, both media - paintings and narratives - also provide
possibilities for multiple perspectives. Artists do not just offer op-
tical perspectives to the viewer in their handling of land and city
scapes; they also choose to depict the relationships of those things
pictured to each other by means of internal perspectives indicated
by the gazes, shapes, and relationships of their ﬁgures. Social sci-
entists also take a particular viewpoint, using a conceptual or
theoretical ‘lens’ to observe their materials and shape the devel-
opment of their narratives, but they too use parallel techniques in
creating internal perspectives to conﬁgure the relationships within
their ﬁeld. For example, a classic piece of anthropology (Deep South,
Davis, Gardner, & Gardner, 1941) used ethnographic techniques to
elicit subject-based judgements of the class and caste structure of
the 1930s deep southern USA - thus revealing what each segment
of society thought of the others presented within their overall
narrative in a hierarchical tabulated structure. The authors also
found ways to present in perspectival form (a graph, in two-
dimensional space), the various cliques within these castes and
classes, and their overlapping memberships in that society. Society
- by caste, class and clique - was conﬁgured in these processes.
These two initial points about how painters order the materials
in their pictures provide the starting point for understanding how
narrative ordering or conﬁguring works in the social sciences. Such
narrative ordering can be understood to take the same two broad
forms practised by painters: colligation - bringing things together
and bounding them in one ﬁeld; and juxtaposition - making use of
alternative perspectives, both as ways to conﬁgure the case
narrative.2.1. Conﬁguring by colligation
The term colligation is not a common one, but the notion of
ordering it brings is well demonstrated here - in the visual
analogical materials that I suggest are helpful - in Pieter Bruegel the
Elder’s painting Children’s Games of 1560 (see Fig. 1). The title is
innocuous, but already suggests that more than description is
involved. The picture depicts a Dutch landscape that ranges from
urban to rural across the canvas. Arrayed across every spare bit of
the free ground (that takes up more than half of the canvas space)
are children playing games, not all playing one game, but gathered
into little groups playing all sorts of different games. Each little
group is an island unto itself, there is no interaction, they are not
ordered in any obvious hierarchical or categorical way other than
being brought into one place, though the viewer could, with ease,
see that there are ball games, throwing games, hoop games, and so
forth. The concept for Bruegel’s picture is children’s play, and the
phenomena assembled are the various different children’s games.
His other pictures of the period that ﬁt in this genre portray ‘Winter
Games’, ‘Dutch Proverbs’ and ‘Justice’, offering - in many small
sectioned examples - closely observed bits of life ﬁtted under a
conceptual title.
Breugel’s pictures capture what I have in mind in this ﬁrst kind
of narrative ordering, and I use the term colligation because it has a
number of meanings resonant for narrative ordering in the sci-
ences. The online OED suggests several deﬁnitions.6 The ﬁrst set
refers to making connections, a ‘material binding together’, a
conjunction or alliance. Neat, also for my purposes is that it is a
term of inductive logic from the mid nineteenth century referring
to the gathering together of facts and their relationships to6 http://www.oed.com, consulted 4th December 2016.
ative ordering and explanation, Studies in History and Philosophy of
Fig. 1. Pieter Breugel, Children’s games.
Kunsthistorisches Museum in Vienna.
https://www.google.com/culturalinstitute/beta/asset/children%E2%80%99s-games/CQEeZWQPOI2Yjg?hl¼en.
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science: “The conceptions of our own minds, and the colligation of
observed facts by the aid of such conceptions; ”while the historian,
jurist and social scientist Henry S. Maine in 1861 refers explicitly to
“the colligation of social phenomena”. Finally, a meaning from
linguistics refers to “members of word classes related to each other
in syntactical structures”, thus capturing something of the grouping
and categorizing elements implied by the term. As a form of
ordering then, I use colligation to capture the way a scientist both
brings together, and assembles, a set of similar elements framed
under some overall guiding conception, or categorization schema.
Conﬁguring by colligation is exactly what happens in the
narrative Middletown, an urban sociological-anthropological study
of a middle American, mid-sized, town in the 1920s (Lynd & Lynd,
1929). It develops a portrait of contemporary American urban
community life, subdivided into accounts of work, home, educa-
tion, leisure, religion, and community activities, and it provides a
historical dimension to how each of these aspects of life has
experienced changes over that of the previous generation. This
description does the study less than justice, for it contains accounts
of new consumerism, of new ways of working, indeed, of what it
means to be young and ‘modern’ in such an environment in
contrast to the lifestyle of its parent and grand-parent generations.
Its account of the residents of the town, described and categorised
in their various activities, was taken to represent both the average
and the variations of behaviour, attitudes and opinions to be found
amongst such urban Americans. It is both closely observational and
so descriptive, but also analytical in social science terms for the
ways that it assembles, groups, and categorises within each
category.
Middletown’s narrative of middle American’s urban life is like
Breugel’s picture of children’s games - it provides a rich and
enticing portrait, a dense picture of life in middle America. This
social science case study proved valuable and convincing in two
senses. First, it provided a snapshot knowledge set of ‘average’Please cite this article in press as: Morgan, M. S., & Hirschman, A. O., Narr
Science (2017), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.shpsa.2017.03.006Americans used bymany in the society of its day (Igo, 2007), and by
historians later. Indeed, it quickly became exemplary in the sense
that Middletown came to represent ‘middle’, urban, America: the
average town. Second, the study also created a model for doing
urban community studies, and how to create a rounded picture of
an urban community. Yet, it was also limited in a particular way.
Ordering by colligation here involved dividing and bringing
together, classifying and categorizing, the social experiences of the
towns-people to show how the community was ordered. But it did
not explain what made it ordered in that particular conﬁguration
nor what held those activities of life together and made the com-
munity cohere. The kind of relational work that showed how these
categories of living were interwoven and linked together was
missing. Just as Breugel’s children played games in small inde-
pendent groups, the overall narrative of life of Middletown
remained determinedly and strangely, patchwork.
Coherence making via colligation brings things together, orga-
nises the materials, and frames the whole; it suggests categories or
divisions - using internal borders - that go to make up the whole.
Processes of colligation do not in themselves raise questions and
offer answers and so conﬁguring by colligation does not in itself
create the internal resources that create ‘explanatory narratives’.
The ordering or conﬁguring ofMiddletown did not set up questions
and present puzzles; there were no questions to resolve, and no
answers because no questions. Thus,Middletown itself produced an
important and exemplary case, but there was and is no ‘Middletown
narrative’, no exemplary account that sorted out puzzles in urban
societies in such a way that the narrative account could travel to
studies of other urban areas so that they might then, in turn, be
described as ‘a case of Middletown’. This is in sharp contrast to a
case that comes later, Street Corner Society, which did provide an
exemplary narrative in explaining a puzzle about the ways of urban
slum living, and carried conceptual or abstract resonances to apply
in other urban community studies.ative ordering and explanation, Studies in History and Philosophy of
9M.S. Morgan, A.O. Hirschman / Studies in History and Philosophy of Science xxx (2017) 1e12 52.2. Conﬁguring by juxtaposition and puzzling
The solution of puzzles is a critical element of Paul Roth’s (1989)
recipe for understanding how narratives explain in history and
ethnography-based human/social sciences. “Narratives explain, on
this account, by providing stories as solutions to problems” (Roth,
1989, p 469). But Roth largely leaves open the problem of how
this works. How are the ingredients of a narrative ordered to raise
questions and solve them? How does narrative ordering work to
create problems or puzzles and so operate as the housing for in-
dividual concrete case explanations?
For this agenda, much more signiﬁcant than processes of colli-
gation, are the processes by which contrasts and differences are
raised within the narrative. Stephen Turner (1980) argues that so-
ciological explanations are ‘translations’ - they arise from com-
parisons which raise puzzles.7 Such comparisons may be implicit,
stemming from the contrast between the sociologists’ own taken-
for-granted experience and those found in their research site.
And while Turner’s ‘translation’ argument is about sociological
explanation, it might well be indicative for anthropology too which
uses case work as its modus operandi. Such comparisons may arise
for other reasons; in economics for example, theymay by prompted
by a lack of ﬁt between the assumptions of a theory compared to
the reality of life on the ground. But it remains unclear why
answering such puzzles prompted by comparisons would create
narratives as a way of resolving those puzzles. Narratives are not
the only way of answering puzzles, they are one way of doing so.
Perhaps the key comes not from the methodological approach of
any one social science ﬁeld, but rather from the empirical problems
of case study work.
Easy comparison is not there for the taking in case study work,
because what is found in the ﬁeld of study are not simply facts,
observations or phenomena, let alone ready-made descriptions of
phenomena awaiting the social scientist’s re-description, but
something much less obvious. Clifford Geertz, as anthropologist,
described the problem thus: the ﬁeld presents the social researcher
with a knot of puzzles:
a multiplicity of complex conceptual structures, many of them
superimposed upon or knotted into one another, which are at
once strange, irregular, and inexplicit, and which he must
contrive somehow ﬁrst to grasp and then to render
(Geertz,1973, p 10).
Grasping and untying the complex is one thing, but it must then be
re-ordered and rendered into something that makes sense out of
the puzzles and confusion. The social scientist faced with this
confusion uses their conceptual and theoretical gaze to unravel and
then to order the disparate materials presented in the ﬁeld. That is,
case study work in social sciences is a mode of enquiry that most
fruitfully focusses on the exploration of puzzles within a single
case, not on re-describing materials to ﬁt a general hypothesis or
theory. Puzzles or confusion in science do not necessarily lead to
narrative solutions: for example, if the confusion existed in a large
data set on one phenomenon (eg statistics on death rates or busi-
ness cycles), processes of pattern-making rather than narrative
ordering might be required. But the scientist here is faced with
many different pieces, even kinds, of evidence that must be ordered7 Turner’s argument is a more general one about sociological explanation and not
speciﬁc to narrative modes or case study work.
8 Case studies are often thought to suffer from the problem that n ¼ 1, and thus
inferior compared to statistical work for justiﬁcation purposes, but in fact, in
evidential terms, n ¼ many, but many different kinds of observations, not many
different observations of the same kind (see Morgan, 2012).
Please cite this article in press as: Morgan, M. S., & Hirschman, A. O., Narr
Science (2017), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.shpsa.2017.03.006into sense.8 Narrative is the natural solution form here to puzzles
presented by disparate materials, not just because there are typi-
cally many different elements to be ordered, but because it is the
retying that counts: it is retying the elements that puts them into
relation to each other (remember, a narrative is not just a
chronicle).
Putting elements into relation to each other when they appear
in opposition is the key here. To return to the analogy: questions are
raised in visual arts by making internal framings and perspectives
that offer juxtapositions. The same is true in social science case
studies, and once raised or recognised as such, the scientist uses
methods of analysis and abstract concepts or theories from their
scientiﬁc subject ﬁeld to analyse the case evidence and so to pro-
vide answers or solutions to those questions. So, this alternative
process of conﬁguring comes not - as in colligation - from locating
separate or isolated elements that might naturally ﬁt together, but
rather from understanding that many elements initially presented
in the social ﬁeld don’t appear to ﬁt together. That is, the elements
of social research are already found in juxtaposition, and are
therefore ordered so in the narrative - presenting a kind of puzzle
that has to be unravelled. But because they are found in the same
social ﬁeld, they give the social scientist good reason to think that
they should ﬁt together - in someway or other - rendering disparate
and even oppositional matters into a narrative explanation. Easy
consistency, easy coherence-making, here is not a virtue. Easy
consistency in any case is rarely possible.
I turn to two visual forms that use juxtapositions as a parallel to
illuminate the ordering activities of social science narratives.9
These comparative visual examples indicate the means by which
the particularities of the site elements are constituted as puzzles by
the use of generic and thematic or conceptual materials. Their
usefulness will become fully apparent in the social science case
discussions immediately after.
Juxtaposition is the kind of conﬁguring process that is best
demonstrated in the visual ﬁelds by the genre of ‘emblematics’.10
Multimedia ‘emblems’ appeared in European visual and textual
culture in the early modern period. The literature on them is
considerable, and there is much detailed argument about the genre,
but there seems to be agreement that the usual elements to be
conﬁgured - a visual part, a textual part, and an inscription - were
brought together to create puzzles to be solved. As with much of
early modern culture, the implications of the elements are not
immediately obvious to us now, but they were not supposed to be
so even then. They were purposely created to provide an enigma
which had to be puzzled out, for the meaning of the interactions
and intersections of the elements were hidden. That is, the juxta-
posed elements had to be made to ‘speak to each other’ in order for
their separate elements, and their combination, to be made rele-
vant to the explanatory title and thus to speak to the viewer.11
Puzzling out these emblems was a project for the educated
(rather than the noble) elite. Commentators also suggest that it is a
feature of these emblems that they involved two general levels.
First they possessed conceptual materials amongst these separate
puzzling elements, and secondly the solution to the puzzle spoke toI am prompted by Geertz’s astute remark that the “line between mode of
representation and substantive content is as undrawable in cultural analysis as it is
in painting” (1973, p 16).
10 Amongst a considerable literature (including a journal dedicated to the genre:
Emblematica), the most relevant sources here are Bath, 1994, Russell, 1986 and
2009, and Stafford, 2008.
11 Ashworth (1996), in one of the few uses of this notion in history of science,
shows how that this ‘emblematics’ form of gathering together different kinds of
information to shed light on a phenomenon was symptomatic of some early
modern natural history.
ative ordering and explanation, Studies in History and Philosophy of
Fig. 2. François Demoulins, Traité des vertus cardinales. j Gallica.
Bibliothèque nationale de France.
http://gallica.bnf.fr/ark:/12148/btv1b6000782z/f15.item.
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individual ‘devices’, designed to project an individual’s character,
with an individual motivation, at a speciﬁc point in time). So the
generic qualities that emblems possessed had ideational or con-
ceptual qualities.
The idea of an emblem makes more sense with an exemplar,
dating from 1515 and titled very plainly “Prudence” with an
accompanying representation (the text in this case is missing, see
Fig. 2). The visual elements are several: amediaeval lady (apparently
in mourning - see Russell, 1986) with her hands resting on a
mathematical compass and a shield showing scales, probably scales
of justice since there is a crown over them, a stag in the nearby forest
with a cruciﬁxion ﬁgure on its head, and so forth. We don’t need to
know much of early modern culture and its symbols to recognise
both Christian icons and the presence of justice and perhaps
something about measuring. Notice that despite the particularities
of the visual elements, they all allude to conceptual elements or
ideas associated with various cultural resources, and that many of
these elements also signify several possible different things. But
the most important point is that their combination presents an
overall enigma - it is in itself a peculiar assemblage, and it asks the
viewer: What do those individual icons or emblems have to do with
the title: Prudence? It is in ﬁguring out the answer to this puzzle
that explanation happens - a recognition of something conceptual
or ideal in the sense of ‘prudence’, but with new attributes.
A different genre of paintings of the same period is found in
domestic scenes from the low countries. These are not in them-
selves puzzles, but they raise questions by the juxtapositions of the
ﬁgures and their attributes and actions, thus drawing attention -
within the ordinary domestic scene - to important matters of life
(see Woodall, 2014). Here, the exemplar is by Quentin Matsys: The
Money-Changer and his Wife (from 1514) - showing a bourgeois
money changer weighing his valuables and his wife looking onwith
her hand holding open a holy book (see Fig. 3). The obvious
juxtaposition between money and religion is located in, and
focussed on, the major characters which, at the same time, depict
the relations between husband andwife, framed against a domestic
wooden set of shelves. The juxtapositions are deepened by the
different perspectives of contemplative gaze of the two main ﬁg-
ures, and on the two inset frames, one the holy book which holds a
religious picture, and the other, amirror reﬂecting (from the hidden
side of the room) a further ﬁgure (maybe in prayer) and beyond
that a window with a cross division in the panes and church spire
beyond. A further inset internal window behind the main ﬁgures
reveals a chamber (or possibly the outside) showing two further
ﬁgures engaged in argument. This calm, almost stationary, scene of
domesticity nevertheless deals with some weighty issues that are
represented in ways which suggest degrees of difference on the
personal level and on the abstract level (even for those knowing
little of the historical context of the painting). These kinds of pic-
tures raise questions without necessarily providing the materials
for answering them - their conﬁguration rests on a series of jux-
tapositions or disjunctions which indeed seems to be the aim of the
representation.
These two genres are question-raising pictures: emblems have
been described as ‘speaking pictures’ (Bath, 1994), and the low
country domesticities as ‘thinking pictures’, terminologies which
immediately point to their function rather than their subject.12 That
is, they are not conventional ‘story’ pictures, which aim to capture
the critical turning point in a narrative that is already known to the
viewer (such as Susanna and the Elders, or the history of Ulysses).12 The terminology comes from Joanna Woodall at the Courtauld Institute of Art in
personal discussions.
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allegories. Rather, even when the iconography of the individual
elements is known, they offer puzzles for the educated to unravel,
or pose issues for contemplation, and reﬂection, for the viewer.
These puzzles are not just raised by the choice of elements
involved, but are equally in the juxtaposition devices such as their
placing, the use of perspectives and internal framings. And
crucially, they embody - at their heart - conceptual categories and
materials.
My project here is not to unravel the puzzles in these pictures,13
but to take the ways that these kinds of pictures raise puzzles as
analogical to the way that narratives do the same kinds of work in
social science - namely by framing, creating perspectives, marking
juxtapositions, and so forth, and how they contain conceptual and
abstract elements from their sciences. I take a further three social
science case study examples here (following the ﬁrst example
Middletown) to show how this conﬁguring by juxtaposition works
to create questions and resolve puzzles within the narrative.
My second example is of a classic social science urban narrative:
Street Corner Society by William Foote Whyte (1943). This account
offers a strong contrast toMiddletown (researched a decade earlier)
and shows how both Turner’s and Geertz’s accounts of puzzling are
relevant. Whyte set out to study and to understand a group of
young men, a male street-corner group, in a slum area of Boston in
the depressed 1930s, yet he came from a Harvard fellowship, and
surely experienced Turner’s issues of comparison. But, as Geertz13 On “The Money Changer and his Wife”, see Woodall, 2014; on “Prudence”, see
Russell, 1986.
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Fig. 3. Quentin Matsys, The Money-Changer and his Wife.
Musée du Louvre, Paris.
http://www.louvre.fr/en/oeuvre-notices/moneylender-and-his-wife.
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he observed (according to his autobiographical accounts) and relied
on the guidance and friendship of those in leadership in the corner
group about what was happening.14 His narrative illuminates my
account of conﬁguring via juxtaposition. His recipe for unravelling
puzzles and rendering answers consisted in raising a series of
framing contrasts: different behaviour within the group by
different members under different circumstances; between the ill-
educated and impoverished street corner group and a group of
better educated and better-off young college men; between the
group’s relationships with racketeers compared to those with the
police; and the two different groups’ (corner and college boys)
contrasting relations with the agents of the political machine.
These juxtapositions are plainly and concretely treated and appear
as a series of mini-narratives each one raising and explaining
questions of group and individual behaviour.
But there is also a broader narrative, an overall solution to a
bigger puzzle, for the case narrative ends up in a dramatic claim, an
about-turn indeed, to the way that sociologists of the day under-
stood and labelled slum communities. Sociologists of the day un-
derstood slums as disorganised places, indeed, not a society at all.
Whyte was happy to admit that “corner boys and college boys have
different standards of behaviour and do not understand each other”
(Whyte, 1943, p 272e3), and that there was a generational clash as
well. But just as clearly, he argued that this community was an
organised society:
The story of Cornerville has been told in terms of its organiza-
tion, for that is the way Cornerville appears to the people who
live and act there. They conceived of society as a closely knit
hierarchical organization in which people’s positions and obli-
gations to one another are deﬁned and recognised (Whyte,1943,
p 269).14 Both Turner’s and Geertz’s points come out clearly in the ‘Appendix’ that Whyte
wrote for the second 1955 edition of his study. See Kohler (forthcoming) for a
discussion of Whyte and his ﬁeld project.
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and explanation in one sentence:
Cornerville’s problem is not lack of organization but failure of its
own social organization to mesh with the structure of the so-
ciety around it (Whyte, 1943, p 273).
The third example is a case study in economics on ‘exit’: the
behaviour of ﬁrms leaving a declining industry, where the econo-
mists’ strongly-held assumption is that ﬁrms will always exit in an
order that begins with the least proﬁtable ﬁrst: that is, exit is
assumed to be ‘efﬁcient’. Charles Baden-Fuller’s (1989) study of exit
of ﬁrms from the declining steel castings industry in the UK in the
1980s found that this order of exit was not as predicted by the
theory: more proﬁtable ﬁrms exited before less proﬁtable (even
loss-making) ones, creating an immediate puzzle. The case study
research used a variety of techniques: game theory, economic
models, statistical work, ethnographic and accounting techniques
and qualitative and quantitative evidence. There were no simple or
obvious answers in the sense that an explanation for the evidence
could be umbrellaed under one formalmodel or found by one social
scientiﬁc method of analysis. Instead, the research process juxta-
posed - in a series of comparative moves - the ﬁnancial means of
the ﬁrms, the type of ownership, the degree of ownership diver-
siﬁcation, and the size of the ﬁrms. This conﬁguring process
unravelled the knots in the materials and the case narrative retied
these to reveal a complex set of interconnected dependency re-
lations and so reasons for the observed pattern of exit. A narrative
explanation emerged of loss-making, owner-managed, un-
diversiﬁed, ﬁrms that hung in the industry well after the proﬁt-
making, conglomerate ﬁrms that were not owner-managed had
left - because the costs of exit were too high (in both real money and
emotional terms) for those loss-making ﬁrms to be able to quit. The
narrative unravelled the factors for the puzzling behaviour, knit
them all back up to show how this contra-to-theory behaviour was
explainable, providing answers to the why questions (ﬂagged by
the ‘because’ phrase above) in ways understood by the economics
community.
For the fourth case, I turn to Geertz’ famous “Deep Play” essay on
the cock-ﬁght in Balinese culture (1972). Roth (1989) provides an
illuminating analysis of this famous essay and recounts how the
latter’s explanation works by locating something deeply puzzling
about these cock ﬁghts, formulates it as a problem, and then solves
it - all in a narrative. My account here complement’s Roth’s analysis
by showing exactly how juxtaposition as an ordering device works
to formulate these puzzles in Geertz’s narrative. Like most
anthropological accounts, Geertz begins by situating himself as the
story-teller in the alien culture with a vivid example of the
particular event to be analysed: a village cock ﬁght. The account
proceeds by ﬁrst giving a base level description of such events and
the betting that this involves. But that description immediately
raises a knot of puzzles for Geertz, which he points to by treating
them to a Benthamite utilitarian analysis (a juxtaposition, but also a
Turner translation moment). In doing so, he raises a why-question:
Why do these Balinese men gamble in a way which utilitarian
analysis - the standard western calculus of rationality - suggests is
irrational? Geertz appears to purposely introduce an alien cultural
framing to pose his question, knowing that this framing will
immediately be found wanting, yet also knowing that it is just
because it won’t ﬁt that it will act as a reﬂective device to reveal
what is happening in the community he studies. Indeed, it is this
juxtaposition that serves to open up the many different aspects of
the puzzle and prompts the next set of framings: a host of questions
about the level of betting, the odds in the principle and side betting
in relation to civil status of the participants, and to the quality of theative ordering and explanation, Studies in History and Philosophy of
15 Of course not all scientiﬁc narratives involve such evidential elements, so
consistency may not be a relevant, or not so strong, a criterion.
16 This criterion is consistent with the mode of ‘not inﬁrming’which I have argued
is one way to think about how case study accounts are given internal validity (see
Morgan, 2012, based on Campbell’s ideas of 1975): a case narrative has to be
consistent with all the evidence, and any bit that does not ﬁt ‘inﬁrms’ the account.
Puzzles arise from recognition that there are bits that don’t ﬁt, so that the narrative
still needs to be attended to. The criterion of ﬁt between a narrative account with
all the evidence for one particular case appears to underpin the work of those
creating ‘analytical narratives’ in the social sciences and history (see Alexandrova,
2009 and Bates, 1998), but that label is concerned to explain only the particular
case account, not to understand how a case narrative might create wider explan-
atory resources.
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succeeds in explaining the betting of the entire community in
relation to individual status and to family allegiances within the
community or between communities.
But whilst betting - in its various aspects - is posed in Geertz’
account as the principle immediate puzzle for the anthropologist
to unravel, the event as a representation of Balinese culture re-
mains to be framed, for that critically important puzzle is left
open. What these various explanations reveal - pointed out
almost with surprise by the author - is the puzzle of why the
outcome of such ﬁghts, and the associated betting with huge
gains or losses of money, seem to be almost without consequence
for those involved. This last is an important question because the
previous solutions to previous questions and answers in the
narrative have been framed by Geertz in terms of the status of
the individual men in that society. Why do these events, which
occur, regularly and everywhere in Balinese society, and which
seem likely to have very substantial consequences to individuals’
status nevertheless appear to have no such consequences in the
community? In other words, all those framings were but internal
to the main problematic, to be unravelled - explained ﬁnally as
‘deep play’, the title of the piece, referring trebly to the level of
betting and odds, to the ritually dramatized quality of the cock-
ﬁghting events, and to the ﬁnal interpretation that these are
games, like children’s play, without serious consequences. This is
play all the way down.
A ﬁrst-cut analysis of these three examples - street corner so-
ciety, industry exit, and cock-ﬁghting - in terms of social science
narratives akin to thinking or speaking pictures will note that, like
those pictures, these social science narratives all rely on generic and
conceptual elements that are deeply embedded in the narrative
description and case analysis. Geertz as anthropologist uses kin,
ritual, and status; Baden-Fuller as economist uses proﬁts, max-
imising, and efﬁciency; Whyte as sociologist uses small group
behaviour, leadership, and community. Different perspectives are
taken to make different cuts through the materials: those of college
boys versus corner boys, of owner-managed versus conglomerate-
owned ﬁrms, gamblers of small worth versus those of big worth.
Framings ﬁrst act to juxtapose, even to discompose, rather than to
prompt initial coherence amongst the particular materials in
conﬁguring the narrative. Juxtaposition as an ordering device cre-
ates narrative depth and scope, both in descriptive terms and in
analytical terms.
We can also see more clearly in all these three social science
case studies how the puzzles are created from the series of jux-
tapositions which still depend upon, and are prompted, by the
internal resources of the case, and then how they are solved by
social scientiﬁc enquiry and how the narrative form provides the
answering analysis. This is a qualitatively different kind of
conﬁguring process than the framing and bounding of colligation
found in Middletown; these other case materials are initially more
obviously knotted, and the ordering process depends upon using
those knots to create why-questions out of the materials. It is in
getting such disparate materials to cohere and in rendering an-
swers to the puzzles in narrative form, that explanations are given.
Now clearly, the elements that are juxtaposed in these social sci-
ences are not visual emblems, inscriptions and verses. But we have
the same process of juxtaposition being used to reconﬁgure un-
derstanding and knowledge by challenging the author and reader
to understand how apparently unrelated or inconsistent elements
nevertheless have relevance to each other, and so how they can be
brought into narrative coherence, using a more conceptual level.
The presence of these conceptual elements is very important to the
way that case study narratives are used in the social sciences, to
which I turn.Please cite this article in press as: Morgan, M. S., & Hirschman, A. O., Narr
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knowledge to travel beyond the case
Conﬁguring processes are ones that make things cohere - a
process of making things ﬁt together, as in detective or forensic case
work, be it ﬁctional or factual. This notion ﬁts neatly with the
criteria of consistency, coherence and credibility that are thought to
be the hall-marks of narratives that emerge from the construction
of legal cases, and before that, in detective work. That is, such
narratives emerge out of the processes of making an account that is
consistent with all the evidence, that offers a coherency within that
account, and that has some explanatory credibility (MacCormick,
2005).15 In the case of social science narratives, that explanatory
credibility is usually cached out in terms of agency and institutions
in the individual and social realm. While the processes of colliga-
tion may be sufﬁcient to develop narratives that pass the ﬁrst and
second criteria of consistency and coherence, the ordering pro-
cesses of juxtaposition relate more nearly to satisfying the second
and third criteria of developing coherence and credibility. But
juxtaposition, as discussed here, introduces a fourth criterion for
narratives in the sciences, namely of puzzle solving, so that justi-
fying the claim that a case study offers an explanation of the ma-
terials requires that the narrative ordering works both to
problematize and to solve the questions in the case. Once again, too
easy coherence or credibility may not be virtues for satisfactory
explanation in the sense that an explanation requires a puzzle to be
solved, that is, it requires an initial incoherence or lack of
credibility.16
The three social science cases discussed immediately above - the
slum community case, the industry exit case, and the gambling
society case - all used juxtaposing modes of ordering in their
narrative, and shared the aim of explaining puzzling or even par-
adoxical aspects of a society or an economy. It would seem obtuse
to suggest that the narratives of these case studies did not explain
anythingwhen clearly for the researchers who conducted them and
the research communities who received and used them, they
offered explanations in a quite straightforward way for the puzzles
in their particular cases at hand (just as a historian will take it for
granted that their narratives aim to explain the particular events of
their history). So, creating consistent, coherent, credible and
puzzle-solving narrative answers to questions provides particular
explanations for the problems outlined in particular cases. But how
far do these single case narrative explanations carry any more
general wider writ, and do they provide extensions to other
particular cases?
Recall that Roth (1989) argued that “narratives explain . by
providing stories as solutions to problems” but he did so in the
context of arguing that if those narratives are to count as expla-
nations they must enable extensions:
Paradigms are solutions to problems posed by concrete phe-
nomena; they are answers to puzzles. As solutions, they becomeative ordering and explanation, Studies in History and Philosophy of
Table 1
Narrative ordering and exemplary possibilities.
Narrative Ordering Colligation Juxtaposition
Narrative Criteria Consistency - Coherence - Credibility - Puzzle-Solving
Exemplary as a method of approach
that can be used at other sites
Lynd and Lynd’s Middletown: exemplary for - how
to construct a description of urban life
Geertz’s Balinese cock-ﬁght: exemplary for - how to construct
an explanation of society
Exemplary as a concrete problem
solution that can be extended to give
an explanation to similar phenomena
elsewhere
Whyte’s Street Corner Society: exemplary for - explaining a
slum society; and for - explaining small group behaviour
Baden-Fuller’s steel industry exit: exemplary for - explaining
order of ﬁrm exit
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extension to related phenomena ... (Roth, 1989, p 468).
Roth uses Geertz’ (1972) essay on the Balinese cock ﬁght as his
exemplar for how narratives explain. While the term paradigmatic
is loaded with too many connotations for easy use here, the notion
that narrative accounts might only fully qualify as explanations if
they enable extensions to related phenomena is important.17 But
there is a difference between Geertz’s narrative proving exemplary
for how to write about culture in a general way, and the claim that
his solution to a speciﬁc puzzle about a gambling society can be
used to explain other such societies elsewhere. The evidence of
these case study narratives suggests that puzzles are generally
solved within the existing community norms - that is, they provide
narrative explanations considered satisfactory to those scientiﬁc
communities for sound epistemic reasons (based on the local social
science set of methods). When we observe those narrative expla-
nations being extended to similar or related phenomena, it seems
reasonable to say that those case narratives have proved exemplary
to the community. But this quality of proving exemplary needs to
be treated with some care for what makes something travel well -
with integrity - beyond the case, to be used fruitfully at other sites is
not obvious. There are several aspects of case work that might
prove exemplary for a community, for example: methods,
measuring structures, or evidence sets, as well as the particular
(narrative) explanation of the case itself. And there are other ele-
ments of those exemplary case narratives, beyond their character as
dealing in juxtapositions, that might be needed to prompt such
extensions.18 These considerations lie behind some critical differ-
ences between the cases from anthropology, sociology and
economics.
To begin with, as Roth noted, Geertz’ essay established an
exemplary case of how to do cultural analysis for anthropologists,
that is, as a method of approach to solving research puzzles in
narrative form. This has made it one of the classic essays not just in
anthropology, but for the social sciences more generally as ‘the
exemplar’ for how to create narrative explanations out of juxta-
positions. But his speciﬁc narrative explanation of cock ﬁghting, or
even a society socially addicted to gambling, does not appear as a
case spawning extensions. In a strange way, “Deep Play” is like
Middletown: it proved exemplary in providing a new methodo-
logical standard of how to do a particular kind of anthropological
analysis, indeed of how to analyse culture, just asMiddletown did in
sociology. But in neither instance, did the narrative explanation of17 It has become very difﬁcult to use the term ‘paradigm’without at the same time
invoking a Kuhnian notion of the term, and this seems to be what Roth has in mind.
18 The problem of what knowledge can be transported beyond any individual case
or experiment or ﬁeld trial to be resituated in a particular site elsewhere can be
thought of as a series of (perhaps many) individual re-situations (see Morgan, 2014)
rather than as a general move to ‘external validity’. But the issue of what travels
from one site to another ‘with integrity’, and is ‘fruitful’ in those new sites, can also
be approached in a more practical way by tracing the ways that scientiﬁc knowl-
edge does travel (see Howlett and Morgan, 2011).
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travelled beyond the case to explain other cases (even though, as I
already remarked, Middletown’s evidence set was widely used
elsewhere).19 The difference between narratives that prove exem-
plary for their method of approach, and those that prove exemplary
for explaining speciﬁc phenomena is captured in Table 1.
The table marks the contrast. While Whyte did not provide a
newmethod of approach to how to do studies of a particular kind of
community, his narrative and label changed the way other social
scientists interpreted and understood ‘slums’. Such groups were
henceforth ‘societies’, for his label, ‘street corner society’, provided
a succinct ‘solution’ to his overall puzzle about the functioning of
those communities and very rapidly became the new term that
‘explained’ other such communities: his narrative explanation
indeed changed the way sociologists and other social scientists
thought about those societies. So Whyte’s concrete case narrative
account of street corner society proved exemplary in immediate
extension to other sites, times and ethnic communities, bothwithin
his disciplinary community and beyond - it was cited nearly 1000
times between its publication and 2010, and across the full range of
social science ﬁelds and sometimes beyond them.
But cases that shift the way a ﬁeld thinks about a generic phe-
nomenon are surely rare and it is equally important for this paper
that a number of other extensions, of more limited scope, were
made from Whyte’s case-work. He dealt with a number of little
puzzles, with solutions developed within the existing ‘normal’
frameworks of methods, creating speciﬁc narratives that ﬁtted
within the big puzzle and overall narrative. These speciﬁc narra-
tives also travelled beyond the case to other sites to be taken up by
other sociologists working on similar problems in other ways. One
such exemplary mini-narrative was Whyte’s explanation of the
relationship between individual status and individual behaviour in
small groups, research that involved new observations, recapping
past history of the group, and purposeful experiment, to answer the
puzzles he had found in this domain. These readily found exten-
sions beyond his case, taken up in research in experimental and
ethnographic methods by other sociologists of the day within their
normal science.
Baden-Fuller’s exit case in economics was speciﬁc to the time,
place and industry, but his narrative explanation based on eco-
nomic theories and statistical modelling also proved exemplary: it
was taken to offer a generic way to understand the pattern of exit in
ﬁrms, and so to provide explanations at that and at other sites. He
had unravelled the economic factors that determined the outcome
to the puzzle and retied them in such a way that the explanation
made sense using the existing economic models and methods of
the day. The phenomenon he addressed had not been previously
explained in terms of that combination of factors, but his expla-
nation made good sense within the then current set of ideas,19 In Geertz’ terminology (1973), Middletown is a ‘microcosm model’, not some-
thing that could generate wider conceptual materials.
ative ordering and explanation, Studies in History and Philosophy of
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ingly, unlike Whyte’s street corner society, the details of Baden-
Fuller’s case (time, place, and industry) were ignored and soon
forgotten, but his narrative economic account, with its main factors,
proved exemplary as evidenced by the fact that it travelled well
beyond the case boundaries to be used (not just cited) more than 50
times in the following 20 years in a variety of theoretical, empirical,
practitioner and policy sites. The case explanation did not funda-
mentally change the way economists saw the exit problem, but
rather offered innovative ways to formulate its analysis differently
and so explain the unexpected outcomes that were observed. In
effect, the puzzle-solving materials and concept-based explanatory
account proved exemplary as a generic narrative explanation that
moved well beyond the original site. So, here the case itself was not
considered special and was not remembered, but his narrative
explanation was.
How and why do the narrative explanations of some speciﬁc
cases, such as the street corner society case and the exit case, prove
to be ﬂexible enough to apply to related phenomena beyond their
original sites, that is, to be taken at those new sites as exemplary in
explaining those other particular phenomena? The ﬁrst point to
recognise here is that such case study work often involves working
abstract, conceptual, or theoretical social science ingredients into
the narrative accounts. These two examples showhownarratives in
social sciences embed more generic elements beyond those found
in careful description, just as the art-pieces: Prudence, or the
Money-Changer embedded conceptual elements. Either these
conceptual elements are brought into the case by the scientist or
they are developedwithin the case as the puzzle is being unravelled
or the solution ravelled. Indeed, it is difﬁcult to imagine narratives
of such cases that do not either bring in, or develop within, con-
ceptual materials in their explanations. Such more abstract con-
ceptual ingredients not only provide the materials to help validate
the explanations given in the concrete cases to the social science
community, but - here is the second point - they also provide the
materials which can support those extensions to other sites. These
conceptual, abstract, and even theoretical materials offer obvious
resources for ﬂexible use beyond the case. Their usage enables
narrative explanations that answer how- or why-questions in one
case to offer possible extensions to (potentially many) other sites.
We have seen that narrative explanations that solved puzzles for
speciﬁc cases travelled quite broadly to various other sites from two
out of our three puzzle-solving cases: Whyte’s street corner society,
and Baden-Fuller’s industry exit. These two cases illustrate different
ways in which materials produced in case study narratives are
taken up by the scientiﬁc community in ‘extensions’ enabling case-
based knowledge to be resituated and used in another case or
realm. And though they come from very different social science
ﬁelds, with different values associated with their community
methods, they share much that is generic to case study work and to
its narratives. But this kind of speciﬁc case extension apparently did
not occur with Geertz’s case of cock-ﬁghting. Can this difference in
extension be characterised, and so understood: does it depend on
some difference between Whyte’s and Baden-Fuller’s accounts
with Geertz’ cock-ﬁghting account?
Geertz (1973) argued for case studies, or perhaps anthropology
more generally, that theory is used at a ‘low level’, which is not to
imply low theory, but theory used very closely to evidence. His
terminology: ‘thick description’, does not mean merely detailed
description, but description that is already understood as ﬁltered; it
is a process of conducting observation plus interpretation. A his-
torian working in the archives, or a sociologist working in a slum
area, or an economist studying an industry full of ﬁrms cannot just
gather data but automatically mentally codes, classiﬁes, and uses
concepts (ie mentally ‘colligates’). But such ‘thick description’Please cite this article in press as: Morgan, M. S., & Hirschman, A. O., Narr
Science (2017), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.shpsa.2017.03.006necessarily also includes analysis of complex conceptual structures
in the societies observed. This is because the social scientist is faced
in the ﬁeld by a knot of puzzles (as Geertz labelled them), and the
strings need conceptual work to pull apart those puzzles and retie
them into an explanation of what is happening.
Whyte, Baden-Fuller and their communities in sociology and
economics would surely agree with this description of case study
research: it is not un-interpreted or un-theorized description, but
they might well differ from Geertz, the anthropologist, over the
level at which concepts, abstractions, and theoretical elements are
used.20 In their ﬁelds, case studies are not thought to generalize
across all similar such sites, but are recognised to create materials
that move beyond the case; case knowledge does get resituated at
other sites to explain puzzles found there as we have seen from
their examples. This is in contrast to Geertz, the anthropologist, for
whom the point is “not to generalize to other cases but to gener-
alize [only] within them” (1973, p 25e6), and that of concepts it not
to abstract them but to think “creatively and imaginatively” with
them. Thus, for him, the case study mode which, in many senses is
the mode for anthropology, involves ‘clinical inference’ - as
appropriate also to psychology and medicine - its narrative is
diagnostic, and so explanatory of the case at hand, not extensible to
other cases (see Hurwitz, in press). Thus, ‘deep play’ is interpreta-
tive of the Balinese cock-ﬁghting society, not of cock-ﬁghting
communities in any other cultures. It is a narrative of exemplary
quality for the interpretation of that particular culture, not an
exemplary narrative offering an interpretation of the combination
of betting, cock-ﬁghting, status relations, and so forth, that might
be extended elsewhere.
Whyte and Baden-Fuller also operated at just such a detailed
evidential level but their narratives also included conceptual,
theoretical and abstract materials which they understood could be
taken from their analysis of the case to be applied, and used to
explain, similar phenomena elsewhere. In Whyte’s case, both his
account of the status-behaviour relationship of men in small
groups, and his new explanatory label, ‘street corner society’,
became generic, and his latter deﬁnition and description of the
societal form of the street corner group very quickly spread to
become standard terminology used in many different ﬁelds. In
Baden-Fuller’s case the various distinctions between different kinds
of ﬁrms was known to be important, but their combination in this
particular context of exit had not been fully recognised. So, even
though economists and sociologists are traditionally thought to not
share much in common, Whyte’s use of theory and concepts in his
case study is similar to such uses found in Baden-Fuller’s account of
industry exit. Both scientists produced accounts out of processes of
ordering (colligation and juxtaposition), using conceptual or ab-
stract elements and categories to create their case narratives of
concrete cases, but those explanations then showed considerable
power to travel to other cases, to other kinds of literature, and other
kinds of users: that is, they were concrete puzzling cases whose
narrative explanation was ﬂexible to extension.
Like Geertz, Whyte and Baden-Fuller used concepts to think
‘creatively and imaginatively’, but unlike him, they used their
concepts at a middle level, a level that involved a degree of con-
ceptual abstraction from the empirical level with the result that
their case ﬁndings could more easily be taken up by others via their
narratives. In both communities, sociologists and economists, there
is an assumption that the case narratives must include all the de-
tails of the case, but must also include a more abstract level anal-
ysis. These conceptual materials are used to support internal
validity for the case-based narrative, but they are the sameative ordering and explanation, Studies in History and Philosophy of
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immediate case narrative. Perhaps this accounts for why their
narrative explanations travelled from their cases to become
explanatory in new sites - because the narrative is bound and
framed in conceptual materials which can travel along with the
narrative, and indeed, which help to make the narrative travel.21 In
contrast, in Geertz’s account, he explicitly argues that internal
validity does not justify external or generic validity beyond the
case, possibly because the theoretical materials operate much
closer to the evidence and cannot be easily abstracted to move to
the other potential sites. Where Whyte and Baden-Fuller used their
middle level theories and concepts as the warp on which to weave
their explanatory narratives, in Geertz’ account the warp is indis-
tinguishable from the weft.4. Conclusion: narrative ordering: conﬁguring and
conﬁguration
Social science case study accounts of society lack the time dy-
namic of history or of time-domain sciences that shape narrative
accounts and that house narrative explanations. And without that
time dynamic, alternative ordering devices are employed. Two
forms of ‘conﬁguring’ have been discussed here: conﬁguring by
colligation (assembling together under a label), and conﬁguring by
juxtaposing. Narrative ordering refers to the way a scientist brings
similar and conﬂicting elements into contact with each other; the
ways that interrelations are revealed and established; the modes of
interleaving; and the process of creating an overall picture inwhich
all their pieces of investigation have a place. By focussing attention
on the way that processes of juxtaposition are associated with the
creation and solution of puzzles, we have seen how such accounts
embed explanatory resources that involve generic conceptual ma-
terials and so the potential to be used beyond the immediate
domain of the narrative.
Conﬁguring is a process and points to an outcome - a conﬁgu-
ration that can be grasped in its entirety as Mink suggests. But these
social science researchers are not looking for a career, or even the
linear layering and ordering of a brick wall, but something more
like a mosaic or jigsaw or collage, where the many individual ele-
ments gain their sense and role only because of their position in
relation to the presence of the other elements. The case study
narratives have all the characteristics of documentaries: reporting,
revealing, analysing, demonstrating an ordering of the elements to
show how they hang together to make up a topic, event, or phe-
nomenon. Such a narrative representation - the conﬁguration - and
its associated explanatory elements, is not reductive to something
else, but that does not mean that it is unashamedly and only a set of
particulars.
Of course narratives do offer particular accounts, but as we have
seen, the use of theoretical and conceptual materials offers re-
sources for those narrative explanations to travel beyond the case.
Such reuse of narrative explanations indicates the possibilities of
narratives having both epistemic and ontological functions in social
science. Epistemic in the sense of a justiﬁed way of developing21 We can interpret this use of narratives as parallelling the use of abstractions as
‘ladders’ to help resituate explanations at another site (see Cartwright, 2012 and
Morgan, 2014). While the presence of abstract models in Baden-Fuller’s work
helped his solutions to travel, this is not incompatible with the idea that narrative
explanations are also an important device for travelling (and thus ﬁnding exten-
sions) - for economists like both formal models and narratives too in their informal
practices (see Morgan, 2012). This is strong contrast to anthropologists whose
‘travelling facts’ depend on the facts being well clothed with details of time and
place before they are accepted (see Howlett, 2008 who has traced how facts travel
within and between the social sciences).
Please cite this article in press as: Morgan, M. S., & Hirschman, A. O., Narr
Science (2017), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.shpsa.2017.03.006social science knowledge, ontological in the sense that without
these narrative materials that later social scientists use, it would
not be possible to state the something is ‘a case of X’, without the
primary case study establishing the exemplar X that deﬁnes the
genus X. And, while the narrative conﬁguring that involves juxta-
position may make more demands on the researcher to ask ques-
tions and prompt answers, a process which requires more puzzling
because there is an initial mismatch might well end up digging
much deeper and providing a more telling explanatory narrative,
and one that travels to other sites, than a more prosaic outcome
from the colligation process of conﬁguration. Disjuncture-based
narratives may well lead to solutions with broader scope and
writ where colligation-based ones may remain more narrowly tied
to their own site.
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